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Natural Gas Exportation Facilities Is Unconstitutional 
Rebecca Kennedy* 
INTRODUCTION 
Horizontal drilling technology advances coupled with expansive shale gas 
resources have rapidly transformed the energy profile of the U.S.1 With these 
advances, the U.S. is on track to become a net exporter of natural gas by 2020.2 The 
development of natural gas in the U.S. has translated into economic growth, 
increased energy security, and lowered natural gas prices.3 Hyperglobalization4 of 
international trade in conjunction with the expanding natural gas exploration and 
production has raised numerous policy concerns in the U.S.5 The majority of the 
                                                          
* Rebecca Kennedy is a J.D. Candidate 2015 at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 Directional and Horizontal Drilling, NATURAL GAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/ 
naturalgas/extraction_directional.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (explaining technological advances in 
horizontal drilling that have facilitated the exploration development and production of natural gas 
include the ability to measure while drilling (borehole telemetry) and steerable down hole motor 
assemblies); Lower 48 State Shale Plays, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (May 9, 2011), 
http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/shale_gas.pdf; Annual Energy Outlook 2013: Market Trends—Natural 
Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_naturalgas 
.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
2 Annual Energy Outlook 2013 Early Release Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION fig.10. (Nov. 10, 2013, 11:57 AM), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/ 
0383er(2013).pdf. 
3 See Economic Impact, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE, http://www.swarthmore.edu/academics/ 
environmental-studies-capstone/economic-impact.xml (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); Energy Security, 
ENERGY TOMORROW, http://energytomorrow.org/energy-security (last visited Dec. 10, 2013); Annual 
Energy Outlook 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 2013), http://www.eia 
.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_naturalgas.cfm (explaining that the relatively low prices of U.S. natural gas as a 
result of “abundant domestic supply and efficient methods of production”). 
4 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 76 (2011) (defining heightened level of globalization that the WTO seeks to attain as 
“hyperglobalization”). 
5 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Allie E. Bagnall & Julia Muir, Liquefied Natural Gas Exports: An 
Opportunity for America, POLICY BRIEF: PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 2013), http://www.iie 
.com/publications/pb/pb13-6.pdf [hereinafter Hufbauer] (discussing the concerns of environmental 
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public’s attention has focused on hydraulic fracturing’s environmental impact 
while failing to highlight international trade concerns.6 
Trade restrictions on natural gas are a critical issue within the framework of 
energy security across the U.S.7 Rich deposits of natural gas along with the 
development of a natural gas manufacturing and export infrastructure helps the 
U.S. maintain leverage over the energy trade.8 This inherent competitive advantage 
in natural gas plays an essential role in providing energy security for the entire 
nation and enables the U.S. to play a dominant role in the international energy 
trade.9 Any restrictions on the trade of liquefied natural gas (“LNG”), an important 
source of energy, must be critically examined.10 
Part I of this article introduces the current legislative framework that regulates 
the exportation of natural gas. This section explores the statutorily undefined public 
interest standard contained in the Natural Gas Act of 1938. The article next 
presents three main arguments regarding the debate on LNG export restrictions. 
Part II presents the problem underlying current LNG export restrictions and 
continues outlining how the current LNG export regime violates the international 
obligations that the U.S. is bound by under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”). Finally, the article argues that the Department of Energy’s 
(“DOE”) current interpretation of the public interest standard is unconstitutional. 
Part III concludes with recommending proposed legislation that should be adopted 
to ensure compliance with both domestic and international obligations. 
                                                          
6 See Corrie Clark, Andrew Burnham, Christopher Harto & Robert Horner, Hydraulic Fracturing 
and Shale Gas Production: Technology, Impacts, and Policy, GLICCC (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.gliccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Hydraulic-Fracturing-and-Shale-Gas-Production-
Technology_Impacts_Polic....pdf (highlighting a number of policy concerns related to water quality, 
increased greenhouse gas emission, and health and safety have accompanied increased global demand 
for natural gas); Heather Cooley & Kristina Donnelly, Hydraulic Fracturing and Water Resources: 
Separating the Frack from the Fiction, PACIFIC INSTITUTE (June 21, 2012), http://www.pacinst 
.org/publication/hydraulic-fracturing-and-water-resources-separating-the-frack-from-the-fiction/. 
7 Energy Security, ENERGY TOMORROW, http://energytomorrow.org/energy-security (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2013). 
8 Ken Cohen, Shale’s Competitive Advantage; A Tale of Two Continents, EXXONMOBIL 
PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.exxonmobilperspectives.com/2013/10/08/shales-
competitive-advantage-a-tale-of-two-continents/. 
9 E.g., U.S. Trade Talks Could Deliver Cheaper Energy for Europe, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2013, 
5:34 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/16/eu-usa-trade-energy-idUSL6N0JP20L20131216 
(asserting that U.S. gas could give EU leverage against Russian natural gas prices). 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
LNG EXPORTS 
A. History of the Natural Gas Act and the Public Interest Standard 
Following its enactment in 1938, the Natural Gas Act profoundly influenced 
and shaped the natural gas industry.11 The Act was the first major federal 
legislation to regulate the industry and was specifically created to limit the market’s 
power over interstate pipeline companies.12 The Federal Power Commission 
(“FPC”), the predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), 
was granted authority under the Act to regulate the sale of natural gas and approve 
natural gas facilities.13 The Act also requires that import and export operations of 
natural gas and LNG be approved by FERC and the DOE.14 
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 requires that, “[f]ederal regulation in matters 
relating to the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate and 
foreign commerce is necessary in the public interest.”15 Therefore, one implication 
of the Natural Gas Act is that imports and exports of LNG from or to a foreign 
nation require DOE authorization.16 Before an export facility can export LNG, the 
DOE must evaluate the export facility’s application under the public interest 
standard established in the Natural Gas Act.17 Because Congress has failed to 
define the statutory meaning of “public interest,” the definition is open to the 
discretion of the DOE and has resulted in uncertainty in the boundaries of the 
public interest standard.18 There are two categories of applications to export 
                                                          





16 Natural Gas Regulation, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/fe/services/natural-gas-
regulation (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
17 Hufbauer, supra note 5 (discussing the concerns of environmental interest groups resulting 
from the proliferation of drilling exploration operations. FTA countries include 20 nations with which 
the U.S. has a Free Trade Agreement. FTA lowers barriers on trade, while creating transparency in 
investments). 
18 New Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders From Secretary of Energy to Economic 
Regulatory Administration and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Relating to the Regulation of 
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domestically produced LNG: FTA applications and non-FTA applications.19 The 
1992 amendment to the Natural Gas Act permits natural gas exports to the 20 
countries that have free trade agreements with the U.S., but does not provide for 
non-FTA nations, and in fact, disfavors non-FTA nations in trade practices.20 
B. The Debate: Three Leading Arguments on LNG Export Restrictions 
There are three prevailing arguments regarding export restriction on LNG in 
the U.S.: 1) those in favor; 2) those against; and 3) a middle ground or hybrid 
approach, which the DOE has adopted.21 
1. The Proponents of Export Restrictions 
Proponents in favor of export restrictions are often industrial natural gas 
users, such as Dow Chemical and Nucor.22 Dow Chemicals’ chief executive 
articulated his rationale in favor of the restrictions by saying, “I’m protecting my 
shareholders. $5 billion to $6 billion in new Dow Chemical investments were 
depending on the continuation of low gas price.”23 Entities such as Dow Chemicals 
and Nucor specifically support export restrictions, because they artificially depress 
LNG prices.24 These lower prices enable industrial consumers to enhance financial 
gains by cutting cost and increasing profit margins.25 
Industrial users also favor import restrictions because this allows them to 
benefit from lower gas prices.26 If the market export opens up by affecting the 
volume of exports, then the supply of gas available will decline to meet the rising 
demand, which ultimately increases prices.27 The surplus in supply of LNG that 
                                                          
19 Applications Received by DOE/FE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the Lower-48 
States, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/summary_ 
lng_applications.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
20 See Doug Palmer, US ban on LNG exports would violate WTO rules, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2013, 
7:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/usa-trade-lng-idUSL1N0AZMTU20130131 
[hereinafter Palmer]; Clifford Krauss & Nelson D. Schwartz, Foreseeing Trouble in Importing Natural 
Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/business/energy-environment/ 
foreseeing-trouble-in-exporting-natural-gas.html [hereinafter Krauss]. 
21 Id. 
22 Krauss, supra note 20. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 Palmer, supra note 20. 
27 Cf. OECD, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON RAW MATERIALS, OECD 






J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










exceeds the domestic need for LNG falsely lowers the price below market price.28 
There is a surplus because there is no outlet for exporting the surplus LNG 
produced due to the placement of export restrictions halts the export of LNG, 
creating domestic surplus of LNG.29 Domestic suppliers must internalize the loss of 
producer surplus by selling at domestic prices, which are lower than the price at 
which foreign consumers value LNG.30 
2. The Opponents of LNG Export Restrictions 
Pro-trade organizations, such as the National Foreign Trade Council and the 
Emergency Committee for American Trade, are primarily opposed to export 
restrictions.31 Opponents to export restrictions favor a liberal export policy due to 
fear over the potential harm export limitations could inflict upon domestic 
corporations.32 For example, export restrictions prevent domestic companies from 
maximizing profit by drastically limiting their available market.33 This is 
unrealized revenue that could be used toward furthering the development of natural 
gas.34 Consequently, American firms could be left behind and lose their weight of 
influence in the international energy marketplace.35 
Environmental groups opposing increased drilling are also in favor of export 
restrictions on LNG because by supporting export restrictions there is a potential to 
limit drilling expansion.36 Environmental interests groups’ main concern is that by 
                                                                                                                                      
materials_9789264096448-en#page111 (discussing the effects of strict licensing requirements on raw 
materials and the manner in which they may limit exports). 
28 Compare China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO 
(May 6, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm (summarizing key 
points of DISPUTE DS394 in which the U.S. filed a complaint against China for similar export 
restriction measures on raw materials put into place by the Chinese government. The United States’ 
complaint explains that China’s restrictive export regime provides limitations that create scarcity, which 
increases the price of the goods internationally while artificially suppressing the cost of goods 
domestically.). 
29 Alex Tabarrok, The Microeconomics of Export Restrictions, MARGINAL REVOLUTION 
UNIVERSITY (Nov. 10, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2013/08/the-
microeconomics-of-export-restrictions.html. 
30 Id. 
31 See Hufbauer, supra note 5; see also Krauss, supra note 20. 
32 MICHAEL RATNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42074, U.S. NATURAL GAS EXPORTS: NEW 









C R O S S I N G  T H E  L I N E  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










broadening the consumer base for domestic LNG, drilling operations may 
expand.37 Environmental groups specifically oppose the potential increase in 
drilling because drilling can cause water contamination issues38 and lead to 
increased greenhouse gas emissions.39 
3. The Hybrid Approach: The Current LNG Export Regime Adopted by 
the U.S. 
Finally, there is a middle ground argument, which the DOE has adopted 
implicitly.40 This hybrid approach is pro-LNG exports, but without formal export 
restrictions.41 Utilizing this approach, the DOE has slowly approved individual 
projects instead of implementing explicit policy involving export restrictions.42 
Moderating approval on an individual basis provides the DOE with the ability to 
monitor environmental impact while slowing environmental damage.43 
Consequently, environmental degradation would decrease through the limitation of 
drilling operations of LNG and be unable to expand until export facilities have 
been approved.44 Furthermore, the limits on exports regulate the balance of supply 
and demand and prevent drastic price fluctuations in LNG.45 Ultimately, by 
utilizing this approach natural gas can still be exported on a limited case-by-case 
basis while still providing domestic environmental and economic protection.46 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 Sally Entrenkin et al., Rapid Expansion of Natural Gas Development Poses a Threat to Surface 
Waters, 9 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 503, 503–11 (2011) (discussing environmental concerns of 
drilling related to surface water). 
39
 RATNER, supra note 32; Palmer, supra note 20; Hufbauer, supra note 5 (explaining that the 
environmentalist prospective is against a trade policy that would provide incentive to increase drilling 
activity due to the negative environmental impact that drilling could have in the U.S. If the export 
facilities are to be approved by the DOE and the FERC then drilling operations would expand as a result 
of the opening of an outlet for exports of LNG. If exports restrictions are lifted, the environmentalists 
fear that there could be a chance for a surge in drilling operations, which would in turn increase the 
potential for environmental harm.). 
40 Palmer, supra note 20. 
41 Krauss, supra note 20. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
44 Palmer, supra note 20. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (suggesting that limiting drilling operations would provide environmental protection. 
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A. An Overview of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
One of the premiere multilateral trade international treaties that the U.S. has 
signed is the “GATT,” which governs international trade goods.47 The GATT was 
enacted in 1948 as part of post-World War II’s Bretton Woods system, which was 
specifically for the purpose of stabilizing the international economy, and still 
remains in full force today.48 This international trade agreement has been 
foundational in creating a large body of binding international law including the 
creation of the World Trade Organization Agreement and eight complete rounds of 
multinational trade agreements, the most recent being the Uruguay Round in 
1994.49 
The GATT is a multinational effort to promote a globalized market of free 
trade through promulgating rules by which member nations agree to be bound.50 
The conceptual foundation of the GATT lays in the “most-favored nation 
principle” whereby countries may not utilize discriminatory trade practices 
between their trading partners.51 FTAs are incompatible with the GATT and 
undermine the GATT’s underlying goals.52 
B. Quantitative Restrictions: Export Licensing and Permitting 
Requirements Violate the GATT 
Article XI of the GATT explicitly bans export licenses by prescribing: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, 
                                                          
47 GATT and the Goods Council, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/gatt_e.htm 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013 10:00 PM). 
48 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (Oct. 30, 1947); 
From GATT to the WTO and Beyond Research Guide, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.law.georgetown 
.edu/library/research/guides/FromtheGATTtotheWTO.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013, 11:00 PM) 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
49 GATT, supra note 48 (These are agreements created by international organizations for the 
purpose of promoting equality and liberalization of international trade. Signatories of these agreements 
are bound by the terms of the agreement. Said agreements utilize enforcement mechanisms such as 
sanctions in order to ensure that the agreements are honored.). 
50 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPACT 
ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 3 (2012). 
51 Trade Without Discrimination, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
fact2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013, 11:04 PM). 
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import or export licenses or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export 
of any product destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party.53 
Gary Hufbauer, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, has criticized the U.S.’s adoption of the hybrid approach by stating, 
“[i]t would be hypocritical and contrary to World Trade Organization [WTO] rules 
for the U.S. to impose restraints on the export of LNG while permitting unfettered 
domestic consumption of natural gas.”54 This process of receiving authorization has 
served to halt trade countries not a party to the FTA.55 Out of almost thirty non-
FTA applications received by the DOE to export LNG to non-FTA nations, only 
four applications have been approved.56 
Export licenses have a discriminatory effect by favoring exports to countries 
that have FTAs with the U.S. over non-FTA countries.57 Such delays are 
impermissible limitations of trade under the GATT. Alternatively, the extensive 
permitting process required to meet environmental requirements also has the 
potential to cause undue delay. For example, because the Federal Clean Water Act 
requires that an export facility operator apply for a permit, an operator must go 
through an additional licensing step before beginning operations.58 
LNG regulation, or regulation of the liquid component of natural gas, is 
distinct from the regulations of natural gas.59 Numerous types of permits and 




56 Nick Snow, DOE Approves Dominion Cove Point LNG Exports to Non-FTA Countries, OIL & 
GAS J. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/09/doe-approves-dominion-cove-point-lng-
exports-to-non-fta-countries.html; LNG Export Study, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/fe/ 
services/natural-gas-regulation/lng-export-study (last visited Nov. 3, 2013, 8:50 PM) (The applications 
for non-FTA exports evaluate energy security, economic and environmental impact). 
57 See Applications for Authority to Import and/or Export Natural Gas to/from the U.S., 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Nov. 3, 2013, 9:50 PM), https://app.fossil.energy.gov/app/fergas/ 
DocketOrderList.go. 
58 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
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licenses must be obtained before operating a LNG exportation facility.60 For 
example, FERC must approve all international exports of LNG from the U.S.,61 and 
the DOE may impose further restrictions if a license is granted.62 The process of 
obtaining these licenses and permits is time intensive and costly.63 Such delays in 
export licensing are a gross violation of the GATT, which has determined even a 
three-month delay to be impermissible.64 The GATT does provide some exceptions 
to compliance, such as critical shortages, conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource when domestic consumption is not similarly constrained, and as part of 
government stabilization plan.65 The export restrictions on LNG in the U.S., 
however, are not covered by any of these exceptions.66 
Finally, the DOE has largely ignored the international obligations that the 
U.S. is under. The DOE has largely disregarded international obligations due to the 
unconstrained discretion in the licensing process. Even though the DOE has 
instituted various application criteria, the agency maintains complete discretion 
when deciding whether to grant a license.67 Considerations for licensing are non-
exclusive and include: domestic need for natural gas, natural gas supply, U.S. 
energy security, and economic impact.68 The DOE’s absolute discretion is the 
mechanism by which the DOE circumvents international obligations without valid 
justification. 
                                                          
60 Id. figs.1 & 2 (demonstrating the EPA’s role in the LNG Project permitting process that 
involves air and water permits, FERC authorization, DPA license, USCG processes license, etc.). 
61 Department of Energy Organization Chart, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/about-
us/organization-chart (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (demonstrating that FERC is a regulatory commission 
under the Department of Energy). 
62 See Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
63 Alan M. Dunn, Trade in Natural Gas: The Resource, The Law & The Choices, STEWART & 
STEWART (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.stewartlaw.com/article/ViewArticle/850#_edn3 (emphasizing that 
DOE’s licensing process in many cases can take over two years, as is the case with considering the 
current export license applications). 
64 Id. 
65 GATT, supra note 48. 
66 Id. 
67 Scott Lincicome, License to Drill: The Case for Modernizing America’s Crude Oil and Natural 
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C. Consequences of Export Restrictions as Illustrated by China 
Restrictions to natural gas exports violate various international trade 
agreements, which make it impermissible to restrict exports in order to gain a 
domestic price advantages.69 The U.S. has opposed this position, arguing against 
export restrictions executed by other nations.70 For instance, the U.S. argued, in 
front of the WTO appellate court, that China’s restrictions on raw material exports 
were unjust, because they favored Chinese producers of raw materials and lowered 
domestic prices in China.71 Furthermore, the U.S. has taken action against China 
for China’s discriminatory trade practices.72 
The U.S. filed a complaint against China for similar export restriction 
measures on raw materials put into place by the Chinese government.73 The China 
export restriction policy is similar to the export restriction regime of LNG in the 
U.S.74 Therefore, the U.S. implicitly acknowledges the conflict that exists between 
such export restriction schemes and the GATT.75 Additionally, the economic 
consequences of restricting exports are analogous regardless of the good being 
traded.76 In the complaint made by the U.S. against China, the U.S. emphasizes that 
raw material export limitations create scarcity, which increases the price of the 
goods internationally while artificially suppressing the cost of goods 
domestically.77 By initiating this complaint, the U.S. has recognized the export 
restraints on LNG are inharmonious with the WTO.78 
It is ironic that the U.S. receives imports of LNG from non-FTA countries but 
uses discriminatory practice against non-FTA countries in authorizing export 
                                                          
69 GATT, supra note 48 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions that make the surplus of a domestic 
product available to domestic consumers below the current market level). 
70 See Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 9–10 (citing examples of internationally contested export 
restraints used by China such as raw materials and rare earth export restrictions). 
71 James Bacchus, U.S. Should Rethink Restrictions On Natural Gas Exports, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
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facilities.79 For example, even though the U.S. imported natural gas primarily from 
the nations of Trinidad and Tobago, Qatar, and Algeria,80 the U.S. does not have 
FTA agreements with these countries.81 From an analysis of the U.S. domestic 
trading scheme, the U.S. policy for LNG trade is inherently biased against non-
FTA countries.82 
D. Constitutionality of LNG Export Restrictions 
The U.S. has a constitutional obligation to uphold the GATT and other 
binding international agreements.83 The U.S. Constitution, Article 1 § 8, cl. 10, 
contains the offenses clause, which grants Congress the power to punish violations 
against the law of nations.84 The broad interpretation of the offenses clause of the 
Constitution takes “the law of nations” to mean “international law” in the general 
sense.85 Multilateral treaties such as the World Trade Organization Agreement, 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the GATT are multinational 
agreements that make up the body of international law by which the U.S. is 
bound.86 Therefore, Congress has a constitutional obligation to enforce 
international law.87 Congress also has a constitutional obligation to uphold the law 
of nations in the broadest sense; and agencies derive their rule making authority 
from Congress.88 Actions by federal agencies based on an agency statutory 
interpretations, must not be incongruent with the body of international law.89 
                                                          
79 Id. 
80 Natural Gas Supply, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis 
.asp#domesticng (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
81 Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Dec. 13, 2010, 10:27 AM). 
82 See Hufbauer, supra note 5. 
83 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. 
84 Id. 
85 Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . 
Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449 n.1 (2000) (quoting MARK W. 
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1988)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 41 (Introductory Note to Chapter 2 1990) (“[T]he law of nations, 
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The DOE’s permitting program LNG exports undermines the “most favored 
nation” principle of the GATT by favoring FTA countries over non-FTA nations.90 
An agency interpretation of a statute in conflict with international law should not 
be given deference when it goes beyond the bounds of the authority that Congress 
possess to delegate to the agency.91 Congress does not have the power to delegate 
authority beyond the Constitution, accordingly, agency interpretations that are 
inconsistent with the constitution are impermissible, and actions resulting 
therefrom must be banned.92 Ultimately, the DOE’s interpretation of “public 
interest” should therefore be consistent with GATT if it is to be deferred to.93 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Natural Gas Act of 1935 currently governs the approval of LNG export 
terminals.94 By 2020 the U.S. will shift from a net importer of natural gas to net 
exporter.95 The booming supply of natural gas has been met with proposed 
legislation to accelerate the rate and degree of LNG exportation.96 Legislation must 
catch up with the rapid expansion of the natural gas industry and increasing 
demands to expand LNG exports.97 With greatly increasing energy demands in the 
U.S. and internationally, threats to the development of the natural gas industry need 
to be critically evaluated from all perspectives.98 
Legislation should be adopted that would expand the public interest standard 
in order to eliminate export restrictions. The current regulatory regime severely 
restricts natural gas exports to non-FTA nations.99 In recently proposed legislation, 
                                                          
90 See GATT, supra note 48. 
91 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
92 Id. 
93 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
94 The Natural Gas Act, supra note 11. 
95 Id. 
96 E.g., S. 192, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 580, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1189, 113th Cong. 
(2013); H.R. 1191, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Proposed Legislation]. 
97 Jenny Chang, Sierra Club and Environmental Coalition Petition the Department of Energy to 
Revise Out-of-date Rulemaking Policy on Natural Gas Exports, SIERRA CLUB (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://content.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2013/04/sierra-club-and-environmental-coalition-petition-
department-energy-revise-out (arguing that the current 30-year-old policy guidelines for approving 
natural gas exports are outdated and recommending that new regulations be adopted to approve 
applications to develop LNG export terminals). 
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there is a demand from Congress to pull back on the power it has delegated the 
DOE and to increase exportation of LNG.100 A Senate bill introduced in early 
January of 2013, S.192, allows for the creation of an expedited and accelerated 
approval process of LNG export requests.101 This bill would further expand the 
current DOE interpretation of the “public interest” standard102 to include: 
(1) a nation with which there is in effect a free trade 
agreement requiring national treatment for trade in 
natural gas (as under existing law); (2) a member 
country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO); (3) Japan, as long as the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan 
remains in effect; and (4) any other foreign country if 
the Secretary of State determines that such exportation 
promotes U.S. National security interests.103 
House Bill 580 is another bill that is being considered104 and proposes an 
expedited approval process without modification or delay similar to Senate Bill 
192.105 This bill would go even further than S.192 to amend the Natural Gas Act so 
as to provide for the exportation of natural gas to foreign nations to be consistent 
with the public interest standard set for in the Natural Gas Act.106 The expedited 
approval process for exporting would only apply to exportation to 1) FTA countries 
2) a member country of the North Atlantic Trade Organization3) Japan and 4) any 
other foreign country if the Secretary of State determines that such exportation 
promotes U.S. National security interests.107 This bill expands the current 
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104 H.R. 580, 113th Cong. (2013); Civic Impulse, GOVTRACK (Nov. 3, 2013, 11:33 PM), 
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exportation regime carried out currently, but still has limitations at the discretion of 
the Secretary of State.108 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The DOE’s interpretation of the “public interest” standard within The Natural 
Gas Act of 1938 is inconsistent with U.S. obligations to international treaties, 
specifically GATT.109 The DOE’s approval process for LNG exportation is 
discriminatory because it favors FTA countries over non-FTA nations.110 
Bestowing an advantage on the FTA countries over non-FTA countries is the exact 
type of discrimination that undermines the most favored nation principle that is 
fundamental to the GATT.111 Because Congress has a constitutional obligation to 
enforce the law of nations, which includes binding multilateral treaties such as 
GATT,112 the DOE’s interpretation, which allows for export discrimination, 
conflicts directly with GATT and should be deemed unconstitutional.113 Legislation 
should therefore be adopted to broaden the public interest standard and avert 
discrimination of non-FTA nations.114 Legislation that halts discriminatory export 
practices is in the best interest of the U.S. for energy security, economic growth, 
and national security, thereby serving the public interest.115 
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